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V 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In docket number 38882, Erica Lee Alcala timely appeals from the district court's 
order revoking probation. In docket number 38883, Ms. Alcala timely appeals from the 
district court's judgment of conviction. 
On appeal, Ms. Alcala argues the Idaho Supreme Court denied her due process 
of law when it refused to augment the record with a transcript of a probation violation 
admission hearing. In docket number 38882, Ms. Alcala argues the district court 
abused its discretion when it revoked her probation. In docket number 38883, 
Ms. Alcala argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessively 
harsh sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In docket number 38882, Ms. Alcala was charged, by Information, with battery on 
a law enforcement officer. (38882 R. Vol. I., pp.51-52.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Ms. Alcala entered an Alford1 plea. (38882 R., Vol. I., p.139.) In return, the State 
agreed to dismiss various misdemeanor charges. (38882 R. Vol. I., p.139.) Thereafter, 
the district court imposed a unified sentence of four years, with two years and six 
months fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Ms. Alcala on probation. (38882 
R., Vol. I., pp.173-180.) 
After a period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation, wherein 
it alleged that Ms. Alcala violated various terms of her probation. (38882 R. Vol. I., 
pp.186-189.) Ms. Alcala admitted to violating the terms of her probation for failing to 
1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
1 
make restitution payments, failing to enroll in anger management, failing to obtain a 
substance addiction evaluation, testing positive for cocaine, admitting to consuming 
methamphetamine, failing to obtain fulltime employment, and failing to report to her 
probation officer on various occasions. (38882 R. Vol. I., p.233.) Thereafter, the district 
court executed the underlying sentence, but retained jurisdiction. (38882 R. Vol. I., 
pp.232-235.) Upon review of Ms. Alcala's period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, 
rider), the district court suspended the sentence and placed Ms. Alcala on probation. 
(38882 R., Vol. I., pp. 240-244.) 
After a period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation, wherein 
it alleged that Ms. Alcala violated various terms of her probation. (38882 R. Vol. II., 
pp.246-249.) At the December 7, 2007, evidentiary hearing, Ms. Alcala admitted to 
violating the terms of her probation.2 (38882 R. Vol. 11., p.265.) The district court again 
suspended the underling sentence and placed Ms. Alcala on a new period of probation. 
(38882 R., Vol. I., pp.270-273.) 
After a period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation, wherein 
it alleged that Ms. Alcala violated various terms of her probation. (38882 R. Vol. II., 
pp.282-284.) At the January 16, 2009 probation violation admission hearing, Ms. Alcala 
2 The record on appeal does not reflect the specific allegations to which Ms. Alcala 
admitted. (38882 R. Vol. II., pp.246-251, 265, 269-273.) Appellate counsel anticipated 
this type of issue and filed motion to augment requesting that a transcript of the 
December 7, 2007 evidentiary hearing be created for the record on appeal, which was 
initially granted by the Idaho Supreme Court, then that order was subsequently 
withdrawn by the Idaho Supreme Court. (Motion To Augment And Suspend The 
Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof (hereinafter, Motion to Augment), 
pp.1-6; Order Granting Motion To Augment And Suspend The Briefing Schedule 
(hereinafter, Order Grant Motion to Augment), pp.1-2; Order (hereinafter, Order 
Withdrawing Order Granting Motion to Augment), pp.1-2. 
2 
admitted to violating her probation. 3 (38882 R., Vol. II., p.300.)4 Thereafter, the district 
court executed the underlying sentence, but retained jurisdiction. (38882 R. Vol. II., 
pp.321-324.) Upon review of Ms. Alcala's rider, the district court suspended the 
sentence, and placed her on probation. (38882 R., Vol. II., pp.333-336.) 
After a period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation, wherein 
it alleged that Ms. Alcala violated various terms of her probation. (38882 R. Vol. II., 
pp.350-353.) Ms. Alcala admitted to violating the terms of her probation for being 
arrested on a felony charge of driving under the influence (hereinafter, DUI), for 
possessing alcohol while in her vehicle, for refusing to submit to testing for alcohol, and 
for being discharged from a treatment program. (09/14/10 Tr., p.58, L.10 - p.60, L.10.) 
The district court continued the disposition of the matter, released Ms. Alcala on her 
own recognizance, and ordered her to report to an in house treatment program, the 
House of Ruth. The district court also ordered her to report to the Cassia county jail 
upon her completion of said treatment program for disposition of her probation violation. 
(09/14/10 Tr., p.60, L.21 - p.62, L.6; 38882 R., Vol. II., p.374.) 
While Ms. Alcala was released on her own recognizance, the State filed a report 
of probation violation, alleging that Ms. Alcala violated various terms of her probation. 
3 The record on appeal does not reflect the specific allegations to which Ms. Alcala 
admitted. (38882 R. Vol. II., pp.282-284, 290-291, 300, 320-324.) Appellate counsel 
anticipated this type of issue and filed motion to augment requesting that a transcript of 
the December 7, 2007, evidentiary hearing be created for the record on appeal, which 
was initially granted by the Idaho Supreme Court, then that order was subsequently 
withdrawn by the Idaho Supreme Court. (Motion To Augment, pp.1-6; Order Grant 
Motion to Augment, pp.1-2; Order Withdrawing Order Granting Motion to Augment, 
pp.1-2. 
4 Ms. Alcala filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea and her trial counsel filed a 
motion to withdraw as counsel. (38882 R., Vol. 11., pp.304-307.) The district court 
granted trial counsel's motion to withdraw as counsel, but denied the motion to withdraw 
Ms. Alcala's guilty plea. (38882, R. Vol. II., pp.304-317.) 
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(38882 R. Vol. II., pp.376-378.) The district court revoked Ms. Alcala's probation, 
executed the underlying sentence, and ordered her sentence to be served concurrently 
with her sentence in docket number 38883. (03/29/11 Tr., p.44, L.19 - p.10; 38882 
R. Vol. 11., pp.403-405.) 
Ms. Alcala then filed an I.C.R. 35 motion requesting leniency, which was denied 
by the district court. (38882 R. Vol. IL, pp.406-413.) Ms. Alcala timely appealed from 
both the district court's order revoking her probation and the district court's order 
denying her I.C.R. 35 motion.5 (38882 R. Vol. II., pp.414-416) 
In docket number 38883, Ms. Alcala was charged, by Information, with a felony 
DUI, driving without privileges, resisting/obstructing an officer, and eluding police. 
(38883 R., pp.52-55.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Alcala entered an Alford plea 
to the felony DUI charge, and in return the State agreed to dismiss the remaining 
charges.6 (38883 R., p. 93; 12/30/10 Tr., p.20, L.3 - p.24, L.23.) The district court 
executed and imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with two years fixed, and 
ordered that sentence to be served concurrently with her sentence in docket number 
38882. (38883 R., pp.103-105.) 
Ms. Alcala then filed an I.C.R. 35 motion requesting leniency, which was denied 
by the district court. (38883 R., pp.111-118.) Ms. Alcala timely appealed from both the 
5 Ms. Alcala is not raising the district court's denial of her I.C.R. 35 motion as an issue 
on appeal. 
6 The DUI in docket number 38883 functioned as one of the probation violations 
Ms. Alcala admitted to in Docket number 38882. (12/30/10 Tr. P.41, L.16 - p.42, L.24.) 
In other words, there was one transaction in May of 2010, for which the State alleged 
Ms. Alcala violated her probation and the State filed a separate criminal charge. 
4 
district court's order revoking her probation and the district court's order denying her 
I.C.R. 35 motion. 7 (38883 R, pp.121-123) 
On appeal, Ms. Alcala's appellate counsel filed a motion to augment and 
suspend the briefing schedule, wherein appellate counsel requested that the record on 
appeal be augmented with various transcripts. (Motion to Augment, pp.1-6.) 
Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered its Order (hereinafter "Order Granting 
Motion to Augment"), wherein it granted Ms. Alcala's Motion to Augment (Order 
Granting Motion to Augment), pp.1-2.) 
On the same date that the Supreme Court entered its Order Granting Motion to 
Augment, the State filed its Objection in Part to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the 
Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof' (hereinafter, Objection to Motion 
to Augment), wherein the State objected to all of the transcripts requested in the Motion 
to Augment, except for the probation violation admission hearing held on September 14, 
2010. (Objection to Motion to Augment, pp.1-5.) In response, the Supreme Court 
issued its Order (hereinafter "Order Withdrawing Order Granting Motion to Augment"), 
and withdrew its Order Granting Motion to Augment as to the transcripts requested in 
the Motion to Augment, except for the probation violation admission hearing held on 
September 14, 2010. (Order Withdrawing Order Granting Motion to Augment, pp.1-2.) 
Appellate counsel then filed a Motion to Reconsider Re: Order (Withdrawing Order 
Granting Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule) (hereinafter, Motion 
to Reconsider), requesting the Supreme Court to reconsider its Order Withdrawing 
Order Granting Motion to Augment, because all of the transcripts requested in the 
7 Ms. Alcala is not raising the district court's denial of her !.C.R. 35 motion as an issue 
on appeal. 
5 
Motion to Augment had already been prepared by the district court. (Motion to 
Reconsider, pp.1-8.) Thereafter, the Supreme Court entered its Order Denying Motion 




1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Ms. Alcala due process and equal protection 
when it denied her access to the requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion, in docket number 38883, when it 
imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with two years fixed, upon Ms. Alcala, 
following her plea of guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol? 





The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Ms. Alcala Due Process And Equal Protection When 
It Denied Her Access To The Requested Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent 
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the 
defendant intends to raise on appeal. The only way a court can constitutionally 
preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove 
that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal. 
In this case, Ms. Alcala filed various motions requesting transcripts wherein she 
argued that, when determining whether to revoke probation, a district court can consider 
all of the hearings before and after sentencing, and even hearings from previously 
dismissed cases. On appeal, Ms. Alcala is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's 
denial of her requests for the transcripts. Ms. Alcala asserts that the requested 
transcripts are relevant to the district court's decision to revoke probation, in docket 
number 38882, and the imposition of her sentence in docket number 38883, because 
the district court can rely on its memory of those hearings when it decided to revoke 
probation and impose her sentence. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in 
denying Ms. Alcala's request. 
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B. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Ms. Alcala Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied Her Access To The Requested Transcripts 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Ms. Alcala With 
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Her Due Process 
Because She Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate Review Of Her 
Claims 
The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ID. CONST. art. 
I §13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiterv. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981). 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United 
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, 
Dept. of Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 ( 1998). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See 
I. C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, 
the cost of such transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); 
I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 
mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. 
I.C.R. 5.2(a). Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding 
before the court .... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to 
9 
"order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from 
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.?(a). 
An appeal from an order revoking probation and a final judgment of conviction 
are both an appeal of right as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking 
probation is an order "made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the 
defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 (Ct. App. 1983). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly 
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can 
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these cases. 
The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection 
clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent defendants 
and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second theme limits the 
states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for review. The states do 
not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request. In order to meet 
the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the states must 
provide indigent defendants with appellate records unless some or all of the requested 
materials are unnecessary or frivolous. 
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. 1//inois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a 
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the 
proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State 
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to 
death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts 
10 
themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was 
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants 
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty 
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold as 
follows: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious 
discriminations. 
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be 
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At 
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary 
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20. 
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In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding 
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court 
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. In 
Burns, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of his 
conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Id. at 257. The United States Supreme Court 
rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to establish appellate 
review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that 
procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less applicable where the 
State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its appellate 
procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of that procedure 
solely because of his indigency." Id. 
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a 
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under 
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of 
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their 
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement 
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is 
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the 
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such 
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for 
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The 
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be 
12 
adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial 
proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections 
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to 
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument 
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If the State 
wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the 
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id. 
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 
2007). 
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation 
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863). In that case, a transcript was 
necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the 
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly in Idaho, an appellant must provide an 
adequate record or the appeal can be dismissed. "It is well established that an 
appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate 
court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of 
the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial 
court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999). If the transcripts are missing, 
but the record contains court minutes, that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful 
review of [an appellant's] claim is possible, although the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
13 
"strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel not rely on the district court minutes to 
provide an adequate record for [that] Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 
491 (Ct. App. 1999). In this case, Ms. Alcala intends to raise as an issue on appeal the 
question of whether the district court erred, in docket number 38882, when revoking her 
probation and, in docket number 38883, by imposing an unduly harsh sentence at the 
March 29, 2011 hearing. At that hearing the district court used Ms. Alcala's probation 
history as an aggravating factor in both docket numbers 38882 and 38883. (03/29/11 
Tr., p.40, 1.13 - p.44, L.22.) As such, a transcript of the evidentiary hearing held on 
December 7, 2007 and the probation violation admission hearing held on March 10, 
2009, are necessary because the minutes from those hearings do not indicate which 
probation violations Ms. Alcala admitted and which ones she denied. (R. Vol. II, 38882, 
pp.265, 300, 371.) Without a transcript of the requested hearings, neither the State nor 
appellate counsel will be able to determine the aggravating and mitigating weight which 
should be properly afforded to her admissions and denials from said hearings. If 
Ms. Alcala fails to provide the appellate court with the requested items, the legal 
presumption will apply and Ms. Alcala's claims will not be addressed on their actual 
merits. If it is state action alone which prevents her from access to the requested items, 
then such action is a violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption 
should no longer apply. 
Additionally, transcript of the requested transcripts are relevant and are 
necessary to determine, for instance, whether Ms. Alcala either agreed to additional 
conditions of probation, thus mooting a claim that her probation was revoked on 
grounds that were not conditions of probation, or whether the court referenced any of its 
prior hearings in ultimately revoking probation and therefore, are relevant not only to the 
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potential merits of the issues but also to create a complete record on appeal. ( See 
State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276, 1 P.3d 299, 304 (Ct. App., 2000) ("Burdett has 
failed to include the transcript from his change of plea hearing wherein, according to the 
district court minutes, he was examined by the court regarding his guilty plea. Portions 
of a transcript missing on appeal are presumed to support the actions of the district 
court."). The transcripts of the probation violation disposition hearing held on January 8, 
2008, and the probation violation disposition hearing held on May 12, 2009, are 
necessary to adequately provide a record for appellate review because in both of those 
hearings the defendant addressed the district court. (R. Vol. II, 38882, pp.269, 320.) 
See Burdett, supra. 
Further, the requested items are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of 
review. The transcript of the combined probation violation admission and dispositional 
hearing is relevant because Idaho appellate courts review all proceedings following 
sentencing when determining whether the court appropriately relinquished jurisdiction. 
State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 289 (Ct. App. 201 0); see also State v. Hanington, 148 
Idaho 26, (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution 
following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events 
before and after the original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing 
when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original 
sentencing and the revocation of probation.") (emphasis added). 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of 
proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Ms. Alcala's Motion to Reconsider will 
render her appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcript 
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supports the district court's order revoking probation and its judgment of conviction. 
This functions as a procedural bar to the review of Ms. Alcala's appellate sentencing 
claims on the merits, and therefore, Ms. Alcala should either be provided with the 
requested transcripts or, at a minimum, the presumption should not be applied. 
2. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Ms. Alcala With 
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Her Due Process 
Because She Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. In doing so, the United State Supreme Court reasoned that the ability to 
be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due process that the denial of counsel 
is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 64. The Supreme Court 
also stated that under the facts of Powell, 
the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure to 
make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due 
process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment . . [to] hold 
otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted 
to, "that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in 
the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may 
disregard." 
Id. at 65. (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and is progeny and determined that the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants the 
right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of 
Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 
According to the United State Supreme Court: 
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In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant 
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it 
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397. 
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious 
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements 
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an 
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he 
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested 
transcripts has prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination 
of the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether 
there is an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor 
of any argument made or undercutting any argument made. Therefore, Ms. Alcala has 
not obtained review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided 
with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991 )), the starting point of evaluating 
whether counsel renders effective assistance of counsel in a criminal action is the 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMNAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION. 
These standards still offer insight into the role and responsibilities of appellate counsel. 
Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state: 
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Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence .... Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
Standard 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate 
counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might affect the district court's 
probation and sentencing decisions. Further, appellate counsel is also unable to advise 
Ms. Alcala on the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal. 
Ms. Alcala is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant 
transcripts. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Ms. Alcala her 
constitutional right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of 
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access 
to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any 
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion, In Docket Number 38883, When lt Imposed A 
Unified Sentence Of Eight Years, With Two Years Fixed. Upon Ms. Alcala, Following 
Her Plea Of Guilty To Driving Under The Influence Of Alcohol 
A Introduction 
There are various mitigating factors present in this case, which support the 
conclusion that Ms. Alcala's sentence is excessively harsh. 
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8. The District Court Abused Its Discretion, In Docket Number 38883, When It 
Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Eight Years. With Two Years Fixed, Upon 
Ms. Alcala. Following Her Plea Of Guilty To Driving Under The Influence Of 
Alcohol 
Ms. Alcala asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified sentence of eight 
years, with two years fixed is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[wJhere a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Ms. Alcala does not allege that 
her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Ms. Alcala must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or 
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
There are various mitigating factors present in this case. Specifically, 
Ms. Alcala's victimization as a child and an adult is a mitigating factor. The Idaho Court 
of Appeals has recognized exposure to abuse during a defendant's childhood as a 
mitigating factor. State v. Williams, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001). Ms. Alcala 
was the victim of abuse as a child. (12/09/04 Tr., p.8, Ls.7-14.) Ms. Alcala was 
sexually abused by her grandfather for approximately five years starting when she was 
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seven and ending when she was twelve. (2004 PSI, p.7.) When she was fourteen she 
started a relationship with an "abusive man." (2004 PSI, pp.7, 10.) Her 2009 substance 
addiction evaluation indicated that she still was the victim of abuse and was worried 
about being physically and emotionally abused. {2009 I.C. § 19-2524 Substance 
Addiction Evaluation, p.7.) According to trial counsel: 
[l]n a town as small as Burley and Rupert and a person who has been 
involved in the court system as long as Erica has been ... there's a real .. 
. familiarity between the defendant and the court system as well as law 
enforcement. And the law enforcement officers I've spoken with, frankly, 
speak of Erica in somewhat fond terms, that is, that even though she's a 
kid who's got a devastating alcohol problem and, frankly, a kid who's got a 
real anger problem, especially when she is intoxicated ... other than that, 
they see her as really more of a victim in her life than as a perpetrator of 
crime. 
{12/09/04 Tr., p.14, L.18 - p.15, L.6.) According to Ms. Alcala, "her childhood traumas, 
i.e. nightmares due to being sexually abused, her history of alcoholism in her family, her 
own drinking at a very young age, and the loss of her first pregnancy all contributed to 
her criminal behavior." (2011 PSI, p.15.) 
Additionally, Ms. Alcala's history of substance addiction is a mitigating factor. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance addiction should be considered as a 
mitigating factor. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982). Ms. Alcala started drinking when 
she was eleven and was drinking regularly by the time she was thirteen. (2004 PSI, 
p.9.) When she was nineteen, Ms. Alcala suffered from severe alcoholism, which 
according to the State was probably attributable to the fact her mother is also an 
alcoholic. (12/09/04 Tr., p.8, Ls.1-7.) Her trial counsel indicated that she had one of the 
worst cases of alcoholism he had ever seen for a woman of her age. (12/09/04 
Tr., p.12, Ls.1-8.) 
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Additionally, Ms. Alcala's mental health is a mitigating health is a mitigating 
factor. The Idaho Supreme Court held that even in instances where there is no nexus 
between a crime and the mental health issue{s), mental health evidence is relevant to 
sentence mitigation. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 569-70 (2008). Here, Ms. Alcala 
suffers from severe depression caused by the loss of her child due to an ectopic 
pregnancy. (2011 PSI, p.13.) 
Additionally, despite her setbacks Ms. Alcala did work hard and displayed 
concern for others while on her second rider. In fact, Ms. Alcala tutored other inmates 
and helped them with their homework. (2009, APSI, p.3.) Ms. Alcala was proactive in 
group, completed her assignments on time, and displayed an overall positive attitude. 
(2009 APSI, p.7.) 
Further, Ms. Alcala has expressed remorse for her actions. In State v. Alberts, 
121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991), the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some 
leniency is required when the defendant has expressed "remorse for his conduct, his 
recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive 
attributes of his character." Ms. Alcala wrote: 
I take full responsibility for my actions I have been grateful for the 
[opportunities] the judge had given me in the past and consider them a 
blessing to have had them. I fully accept the fact that I need professional 
help to overcome this disease of alcoholism, and truly believe that I need 
rehabilitation. 
(2011 PSI, p.15.) 
Finally, Ms. Alcala has support from her friends and family. In State v. Shideler, 
103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that support of family and 
friends are mitigating factors. Ms. Alcala has "solid" support from her mother who 
currently disapproves of her alcohol consumption. (2011 I.C. § 19-2524 Substance 
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Addiction Evaluation, p.4.) Ms. Alcala's mother wrote the district court a letter, wherein 
she expressed her support for her daughter and her willingness to help her maintain 
sobriety. (March 3, 2011, Letter written by Sandra Alcala.) 
In sum, there are various mitigating factors present in this case, which support 
the conclusion that Ms. Alcala's sentence is excessively harsh. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion, In Docket Number 38882 1 When It Revoked 
Ms. Alcala's Probation 
A. Introduction 
While Ms. Alcala's performance on probation has not been the best, her 
newfound desire to obtain treatment is an indicator that she could adhere to the terms of 
probation. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion, In Docket Number 38882, When It 
Revoked Ms. Alcala's Probation 
Ms. Alcala asserts t~at, given any view of the facts, the district court abused its 
discretion when it revoked her probation. When a defendant appeals from an order 
revoking probation this Court has utilized the following framework: 
The decision to revoke a defendant's probation on a suspended sentence 
is within the discretion of the district court. LC. § 20-222. In a probation 
revocation proceeding, two threshold questions are posed: (1) did the 
probationer violate the terms of probation; and, if so, (2) should probation 
be revoked? State v. Case, 112 Idaho 1136 (Ct.App.1987). 
State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Ms. Alcala concedes that she violated the terms her probation. Accordingly, she 
only contests the district court's decision to revoke her probation. "A district court's 
decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the 
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court abused its discretion." State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). "When a 
district court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court correctly perceived 
the issue as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it, and 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923 
(Ct. App. 2003). "In deciding whether revocation of probation is the appropriate 
response to a violation, the court considers whether the probation is achieving the goal 
of rehabilitation and whether continued probation is consistent with the protection of 
society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
As a preliminary note, Ms. Alcala incorporates the augments made in Section 
ll(B) herein by reference thereto. As stated in Section ll(B), Ms. Alcala wrote a letter, 
which was included in her 2011 PSI where she took full responsibility for her actions 
and indicated that she had accepted her alcoholism and accepted the fact she will need 
professional help to overcome her addiction. (2011 PSI, p.15.) 
In light of the foregoing, Ms. Alcala's newfound desire for treatment and 
willingness to adhere to treatment supports her argument that she is capable of 
successfully completing probation. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion 
when it revoked her probation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and 
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which 
arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Ms. Alcala 
respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with instructions for the district 
court to place her on probation, in both cases. Alternatively, Ms. Alcala respectfully 
requests that this Court reduce the indeterminate portion of her sentence, in docket 
number 38883. 
DATED this 1th day of April, 2012. 
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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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